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Abstract We examine the effect of the sending-off of a player on the goal-scoring
rates in FIFA World Cup matches in tournaments from 1998 to 2014. We use a hazard
rate framework in which the effect of a red card is modeled as a shift in the goal-scoring
rate. A red card may harm the team that receives a red card and may be beneficial for
their opponent. Indeed, we find that the goal-scoring rate of the sanctioned team goes
down, while the goal-scoring rate of the non-sanctioned team goes up.
Keywords Association football · Goal-scoring · Red card · World Cup football
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1 Introduction
A red card in association football results in the sending-off of a player. A player
receives a red card after committing either a serious foul or after misconduct. A
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player may receive a yellow card as a caution. Receiving a second yellow card also
immediately results in a red card. The team receiving the red card faces a significant
disadvantage, since the number of players of such a team is reduced from eleven to
ten. At the same time, the resulting power-play potentially presents a goal-scoring
advantage for the opponents. However, it is also conceivable that the sending-off of a
player leads to a psychological “ten do it better” effect resulting in an enhanced spirit
and a better defense of the sanctioned team. This would be in line with social impact
theory according to which an increase in group size decreases the perceived pressure
by members to put in effort. Consequently, the sending-off of a teammate motivates
the remaining players to put in more effort.
According to Anderson and Sally (2013), the strength of a team crucially depends
on the weakest player. Moreover, weak players are more likely to incur a red card
than more talented players. Previous research on the effects of a red card shows mixed
results. This research uses various estimation methods, focusing mainly on winning or
losing or on goal-scoring. The timing of a red card sanction appears to be important. For
example, Ridder et al. (1994) examine 340 matches from the two Dutch professional
divisions from 1991 to 1992, focusing on the scoring intensity before and after a red
card. They find that the goal-scoring intensity of the team playing with 11 players
increases by 88%, while the goal-scoring intensity of the team with 10 players does
not change. Furthermore, using the estimated results, they conclude that a red card
occurring early in the match increases the odds of winning substantially, whereas the
probability of victory for the sanctioned team decreases even more. They also find
that around the 70th minute of a match, it becomes optimal for the defending team to
commit a red card type of foul to an opposing player with a clear way to the goal.
Caliendo and Radic (2006) study FIFA World Cup matches between 1930 and 2002.
Following the modeling approach of Ridder et al. (1994), they also find that the earlier
a sending-off occurs in a match, the higher the odds of winning for the non-sanctioned
team are. The turning point of this effect occurs around half-time, with sending-offs in
the second half of a match having no effect. They do not find any supporting evidence
for a “ten do it better” effect. Bar-Eli et al. (2006) study a sample of 743 games from the
highest German league from 1963 to 2004. They argue that a red card is an indicator
of a psychological performance crisis. Results show that when the first red card was
issued, the score was more likely to be in favor of the opposing, unsanctioned team
than in favor of the sanctioned team. Furthermore, a player’s sending-off weakened
the sanctioned team. Vecer et al. (2009) analyze the 2006 World Cup and 2008 Euro
tournaments to estimate goal-scoring intensities from live betting odds. Such odds are
updated during the match, reflecting the probability of an event such as one of the
teams scoring a next goal. After a red card is given, the odds for scoring a next goal
for both teams are updated to reflect the situation. They show that the goal-scoring
intensity of the sanctioned team decreased, while the scoring intensity of an opposing
team increased slightly. They find that goal-scoring in a match with a red card depends
on the strength of a team. A sanction for the stronger team usually leads to fewer goals
scored, whereas a sending-off for a weaker team usually leads to an increased number
of goals. They also find that the optimal time to commit a foul depends on the score
in a match.
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Mechtel et al. (2011) analyzing matches from the highest German league over the
period 1999–2009 find that a red card given to the home team worsens their final score
and result of the match. Contrary to this, the authors do not find such an effect for an
away team. A sending-off occurring after the 70th minute leads to a better performance
of the penalized guest team. Titman et al. (2015) study goals and bookings—both
yellow cards and red cards—in two seasons (2009–2011) of English Premier League
and Championship games. They distinguish between bookings and goal-scoring for
the home team and the away team. Except for home red cards that only have a modest
effect on home team’s scoring rates for the three other combinations, home team red
cards—away team scoring and away team red card on both home team and away team
scoring, the red card has significant and substantial effects. Yellow cards do not affect
goal-scoring rates.
Not only the effects of issuing a red card have been studied. Also, the determinants
of a red card sanction are analyzed. Some studies examine whether there is a referee
bias. A comprehensive analysis of yellow and red card sanctions in the 1996–2003
English Premier League seasons by Dawson et al. (2007) shows that weaker teams tend
to be more sanctioned than favorites. They also find that the incidence of sanctions is
higher in matches with evenly balanced teams and they find evidence for a home team
bias. After controlling for team strength, the authors find that away teams collect more
sanctions than home teams. Similar effects are found by Buraimo et al. (2010) in their
analysis of matches over the period 2000–2006 from the highest German and English
Leagues. Using betting data to distinguish between “underdogs” and favorites, they
also find evidence for home team favoritism in both leagues. Pope and Pope (2015)
find evidence for a player–referee own-nationality bias. They focus on the difference
between fouls incurred and fouls committed by a player. A larger foul difference
hence implies a larger number of beneficial foul calls. Using player-match data from
the 2001–2013 UEFA Champions League seasons, they find that players officiated by
a referee from the same country have a 10% increase in beneficial foul calls. This effect
is even stronger for national team players as well as in later stages of the tournament.
Furthermore, they find that experienced referees exhibit the same or even stronger
nationality bias as less experienced referees.
In our paper, we build on previous research analyzing both the determinants of the
issuing of a red card and the consequences of a red card on goal-scoring. We study
World Cup matches, as these are characterized by the presence of top players and
top referees. Furthermore, these matches are closely monitored (across the world).
In these matches, home advantage usually does not play a role as the participating
teams (except for one) never play a home match. Therefore, World Cup matches are
well suited to study the effects of a red card on team performance. Our contribution
to the literature is threefold: First, we investigate the determinants of the red card
sanction rate focusing on the effect of the score during the match and the possible
referee bias. Second, we use hazard rate models to determine the effects of a red card
on the goal-scoring rate. Our model allows us to precisely determine the sequence and
timing of events within a match, including also matches where no goals were scored.
This is in contrast compared to Ridder et al. (1994) and Caliendo and Radic (2006)
whose modeling approach requires the exclusion of such matches and assumes that
goal-scoring intensity increases linearly during the match. We allow for a more flexible
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specification. Furthermore, our approach reflects the goal-scoring intensity estimates
depending on actual goals scored without any further assumptions as in, e.g., Vecer
et al. (2009), where estimated intensities rather reflect the evolution of betting odds
during the match. Third, our data allow us to study whether there is any heterogeneity
in the effects of a red card, for example whether it matters which type of player is sent
off. We find that teams who are behind are more likely to receive a red card. We also
find that a red card has a significantly positive effect on the team playing with more
players. Contrary to this, a sending-off negatively affects the goal-scoring rate of the
sanctioned team. Finally, we find that the only relevant heterogeneity in the effects of
a red card is the time at which a red card was issued.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of association football rules and the dataset used in our analysis. Section 3 describes the
empirical model. Section 4 presents and discusses the parameter estimates. Section 5
concludes.
2 Rules, theory and data
2.1 The rules and history
In the quarter finals of the 1966 FIFA World Cup, England, the hosts, faced Argentina,
one of the other favorites, in London, at Wembley. Ten minutes before half-time,
Rudolf Kreitlein, the West-German referee, cautioned Antonio Rattin, the Argentinean
captain, for the second time. This second caution inevitably meant an expulsion. The
sending-off caused a major turmoil, partly due to language problems, but also partly
due to the South-American suspicion of dubious West-European “home refereeing.”
Eventually, Rattin left the pitch, escorted by policemen. Moreover, Kreitlein also
officially warned both Bobby Charlton, England’s skillful attacking midfielder, and
his elder brother Jack, a tough central defender. However, Alf Ramsey, the England
manager, had to ask FIFA for confirmation, as few people were aware of these cautions.
In the aftermath of this match, Ken Aston, an English ex-referee who then presided
the FIFA’s referee committee, decided that something had to be done. He proposed
a card system for cautions (yellow) and expulsions (red). Rumor has it that this idea
took shape in his mind when he stood in front of traffic lights in the British capital.
FIFA introduced the card system at the 1970 World Cup in Mexico.
A player, substitute or substituted player is to be sent off in case of one of these
seven offenses: serious foul play, violent conduct, spitting at an opponent or any other
person, denying the opposing team a goal or an obvious goal-scoring opportunity by
deliberately handling the ball (this does not apply to a goalkeeper within his own
penalty area) denying an obvious goal-scoring opportunity to an opponent moving
toward the player’s goal by an offense punishable by a free kick or a penalty kick
using offensive, insulting or abusive language and/or gestures and receiving a second
caution in the same match. After a sending-off, the squad member in question (player,
substitute or substituted player) must stay away from the field.
Prior to every World Cup tournament, the selected referees obtain instructions to
focus on certain fouls and/or types of misconduct. In 1998, the emphasis was on the
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tackle from behind. In an early stage of this tournament, however, FIFA demanded
the arbiters not to send off players too lightly. Expelling many world-class players
would lower the level and, thus, the attractiveness of the tournament. Four years later,
alertness regarding simulation (“flopping” or “diving”) was given top priority. During
the 2006 World Cup, the referees were supposed to pay special attention to elbowing,
off-side and, once more, simulation. Four years later, they were supposed to simply
focus on ’the rules of the game’. Prior to the 2014 World Cup, the arbiters were
requested, like in 1998, not to expel players too easily. However, in case of elbowing,
or any similar offense, they should still send off the culprit instantaneously.
2.2 Theoretical background
The effects of red cards in association football on the performance of football teams are
interesting from an economist’s point of view. Several theories have been developed to
study the performance and the motivation of a team or group of members. The seminal
work of French agricultural engineer Ringelmann (1913) shows that in a rope-pulling
experiment individual effort decreases as the number of people involved increases.
This phenomenon was later labeled as “social loafing.”
Further work on the subject by Latané (1981) evolved into the social impact theory.
This theory proposes that increasing the size of a group results in a decreased perceived
pressure. As noted by Mechtel et al. (2011), translating this into an association football
setting, an expulsion of a player should increase the pressure on the remaining players
of the team. This in turn should increase the motivation and effort, leading to a better
performance. This mechanism is sometimes referred to as the “ten do it better” myth
(Caliendo and Radic 2006).
According to Steiner (1972), increasing the size of a group may potentially lead
to problems in cooperation and coordination of the members. Hence, high individual
skill levels do not necessarily translate into a better performance if the task requires a
substantial degree of cooperation between group members. A successful performance
of a football team undoubtedly requires the combined effort of all players. It is therefore
conceivable that the cooperation of the remaining players on the pitch after a red card
sanction increases.
Football matches with their red card rules present natural experiments to investigate
the theoretical predictions. One of the performance indicators of a team is the goal-
scoring rate. The exogenous reduction in the size of a team resulting from a red card
presents an excellent opportunity to investigate whether smaller teams perform better.
For this, we study the effects of a red card on the goal-scoring rates of both the
sanctioned team and the non-sanctioned team.
2.3 Data and summary statistics
Our dataset consists of 320 FIFA matches, from five World Cup tournaments from
1998 (France) to 2014 (Brazil). In 1998, the FIFA World Cup tournament in France
hosted 32 teams for the first time in history. Ever since then, the tournament consists
of 64 matches, viz. 48 matches in the group stage, eight matches in the round of
123
J. ˇCervený et al.
Table 1 Tournament statistics
Tournament Number Minutes until first RC
Average Min Max
Panel A: Red cards
1998 22 62 19 89
2002 17 64 22 103
2006 28 65 28 120
2010 17 66 24 120
2014 10 56 37 94
Total/avg. 94 63 19 120
Tournament Average No RC Matches with RC
Average Before RC After RC
Panel B: Goals per match
1998 2.67 2.58 2.81 1.25 1.56
2002 2.51 2.62 2.07 1.07 1.00
2006 2.30 2.34 2.20 1.45 0.75
2010 2.27 2.36 2.00 1.12 0.88
2014 2.67 2.74 2.30 1.20 1.10
Total/avg. 2.48 2.53 2.30 1.22 1.06
Based on 320 matches
RC red card
sixteen, four quarter finals, two semifinals, a position match (for the third place) and
the final. Moreover, starting from the 1998 FIFA World Cup, teams were allowed to
bring on three substitutes, as compared to two players and one goalkeeper in 1994, now
without any restrictions. This gives coaches ample opportunities to substitute players
who have already received a yellow card, thus avoiding that these players receive a
second yellow card, i.e., a red card.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the dataset. In total, our dataset includes
94 red cards. The highest number of 28 red cards was awarded in 2006 (Germany),
followed by 22 red cards in 1998. In both the 2002 and 2010 tournaments played in
South Korea/Japan and South Africa, respectively, 17 red cards were awarded. Finally,
the lowest number of only 10 red card sanctions occurred in 2014. As can be seen,
most red cards are issued in the second half of the match, on average around the 65th
minute. The only deviation is the 2014 tournament, where on average a red card was
awarded in the 56th minute. The earliest red card was given in the 19th minute, and
the first red card that was given in the latest stage of match was in the 120th minute in
2006 and 2010.
As shown in Panel B, the average number of goals per match has fallen from 2.67
in 1998 to 2.27 in 2010. The 2014 tournament reversed this trend with 2.67 goals per
match scored. On average, more goals were scored in matches without a red card.
Also, in matches with at least one red card, fewer goals were scored after the red card
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Table 2 Sample characteristics Variable Mean Min Max
Panel A: Match characteristics
Rank 21.30 1 105
Group stage 0.75 0 1
16 finals 0.12 0 1
Quarterfinals 0.06 0 1
Semifinals 0.03 0 1
Final/3rd place 0.03 0 1
Goal difference at RC −0.44 −3 2
Goals scored 1.24 0 8
Same continent referee 0.06 0 1
Referee rank 5.28 1 10
Referee rank missing 0.54 0 1
Panel B: Player characteristics
Age 2.74 2.1 3.5
Caps 4.17 0.1 11.3
Midfielder 0.43 0 1
Forward 0.22 0 1
Defender 0.35 0 1
Midfielder 0.44 0 1
Forward 0.21 0 1
Based on 320 matches
RC red card; player
characteristics refer to players
receiving a red card. Defender
includes goalkeeper
was issued than before. However, the average duration of the match after a red card is
much shorter than the duration up to the first red card. Taken this difference in duration
into account, it is clear that the goal-scoring intensity is higher after a red card than
before.
Table 2 gives an overview of the characteristics of our sample (the definition of the
variables is given in “Appendix”). The rank of the team ranges from one to 105 with
an average of 21.3. The goal difference at the time the first red card was issued ranges
from minus three to plus two with an average of −0.44. Tactics of teams usually differ
between group and elimination rounds of a tournament. Also, team strength is usually
more equal as weak teams are already out. Therefore, in our analysis we also include
a dummy variable indicating whether a match is played in the group phase or later
stages of the tournament. The total number of goals scored per match ranges from 0 to
8. In the analysis, we will investigate to what extent the referee matters. For this, we
use two indicators. First, whether the referee is from the same continent as the team
for which we analyze the goal-scoring rate or the red card sanction rate. Second, we
take the rank of the referee 1 year prior to the tournament into account. The bottom
rows of Table 2 show which type of players received a first red card in the game.
Table 3 gives the distribution of the red cards by 15 min intervals in the match.
No red card was issued in the first 15 min of any match. Most red cards were given
in the last 15 min of regular time; only five red cards were issued in extra time. This
means that in about 25 % of the matches at least one red card was issued, while in the
123
J. ˇCervený et al.
Table 3 Distribution of red
cards per 15 min intervals Minute First Later Total
0–15 0 0 0
16–30 9 0 9
31–45 19 0 19
46–60 14 1 15
61–75 16 1 17
76–90 22 6 28
91–105 1 0 1
106–120 3 0 3
Total 84 8 92
Based on 320 matches of which
27 matches with extra time. Two
red cards were given to players
on the bench and are thus not
included in the analysis
extra time matches this was less than 20%. The focus of our analysis will be on the
84 first red cards, ignoring eight later red cards and two red cards that were presented
to players on the bench.
2.4 Exploratory analysis
Before analyzing the effect of a red card on the goal-scoring rate, we present a prelim-
inary analysis of the effect of a red card on the outcome of a match. This is a similar
approach as used by Mechtel et al. (2011). We first estimate a simple probit model
which takes the following form:
Pr
(
yi = 1 | z′i
) = Φ (z′iξ + drcγ1 + dorcγ2
) (1)
where yi is the outcome variable taking a value of 1 if the team won a match, z′i
is vector of explanatory variables, the parameters γ1 and γ2 capture the effect of an
opponent’s and an own red card on the outcome of a match and Φ is the cumulative
standard normal distribution function. We estimate the probability of winning the
match for both teams. From the total of 320 matches, this results in 640 observations
used in the analysis. In addition to this, we estimate a linear model including the same
explanatory variables, with a dependent variable taking values of 0 if the team loses,
1 for a draw and 2 for a win.1 The results are summarized in Table 4. Columns (1) and
(2) present estimates from the probit model and columns (3) and (4) from the linear
model. Columns (2) and (4) are excluding extra time results.
It is clear that a higher number of goals scored increase the probability of winning
a match substantially. Figure 1 plots the probability of winning as a function of the
number of goals scored (the gray area represents the 95% confidence interval). After
scoring the first goal, the probability of winning is equal to 22%. Scoring a second
goal increases the probability of winning to 68%, whereas the third goal takes the odds
of winning up to 95%. Similarly, the probability of winning a match increases if the
opposing team receives red card. For the team penalized with a red card sanction, the
1 We also investigate an ordered probit specification finding very similar results.
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Table 4 Parameter estimates probability to win a match
Probit model Linear model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opponent RC 0.23** (3.3) 0.24*** (3.4) 0.47*** (5.8) 0.50*** (6.1)
Own RC −0.28*** (8.3) −0.31*** (9.2) −0.37*** (4.3) −0.41*** (4.7)
Rank opponent 0.06*** (5.1) 0.06*** (5.1) 0.12*** (7.3) 0.12*** (7.2)
Rank own −0.08*** (5.6) −0.08*** (5.5) −0.12*** (7.4) −0.12*** (7.2)
16 finals −0.07 (1.4) 0.05 (1.3) −0.01 (0.5) −0.01 (0.4)
Quarterfinals −0.06 (0.9) −0.03 (0.4) −0.03* (1.7) −0.02 (1.6)
Semifinals −0.04 (0.6) 0.01 (0.1) −0.03 (1.3) −0.03 (1.1)
Final/3rd place m. −0.05 (0.6) 0.06 (1.1) −0.05 (1.4) −0.05 (1.3)
Goal diff at RC 0.21** (2.7) 0.20** (2.5) 0.22** (3.5) 0.20** (3.2)
Constant −0.24** (2.4) −0.24** (2.6) 1.00*** (111.7) 1.01*** (111.2)
Log likelihood 355.0 360.2 725.6 743.9
Extra time included Yes No Yes No
640 observations; absolute t statistics in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the match level
Probit model: probability of winning a match, marginal effects; linear model: 0 for a loss, 1 for a draw, 2
for a win; rank divided by 10
RC red card
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Fig. 1 Probability to win as function of goals scored.
Note The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval
odds of winning decrease substantially. The lower the ranking of the opponent, the
higher the probability of winning a match. Conversely, the lower the ranking of the
team itself, the lower the odds of winning. The stage of tournament does not seem to
have any effect. The more goals a team is ahead of its opponent before the red card,
the higher the probability of winning the match.
At the mean value of the explanatory variables, the marginal probability of winning
a match before a red card sanction is equal to 29%. After an opponent’s red card
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Fig. 2 Red card imposing rate and cumulative red card probability. a Red card rate. b Cumulative red card
probability
sanction, the odds of winning increase by 23 percentage points to almost 52%. After
the team itself receives a red card, the odds of winning decrease from 35% to only 7%.
The results shown in columns (3) and (4) make it clear that these are not dependent on
the specific functional form assumptions underlying the probit model and the linear
model.
3 Setup of the analysis
3.1 Imposition of a red card
A red card foul is a phenomenon that usually occurs later in a football match but very
rarely within the first 20 min of a match. In our dataset, the earliest red card awarded
was in the 19th minute. This is shown in Fig. 2 which plots the rate at which red cards
were issued in a match. The highest occurrence of red card sanctions is around the
45th minute of a match, with another peak around the 75th minute. Figure 2 also plots
the cumulative probability that a red card is imposed. Within the first half of the match,
the probability of committing a red card offense is less than 10%. In the course of the
second half of a match, this figure rises to slightly more than 20%.
We model the rate by which a red card is imposed using a mixed proportional hazard
model. The red card sanction rate at time t conditional on observed characteristics x
and unobserved characteristics υ is specified as follows2:
θr (t | x, υ) = λr (ti ) exp
(
x ′βr + υ
) (2)
2 The end of the first half of the match is assumed to be at the 45th minute. The end of the second half of
the match is assumed to have an injury time of 5 min for all matches included in the analysis. The extra
time matches are modeled as follows: The first part of the extra time is assumed to be 15 min, while the
second part is assumed to be 17 min, so including 2 min of injury time. In some tournaments, matches in
extra time could have been concluded by a golden goal. Then, match time stops at the moment a golden
goal is scored.
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where βr is a vector of parameters. The duration dependence is flexibly modeled using
step function:
λr (ti ) = exp
(∑
k
λk,r Ik(t)
)
(3)
where k(=1, . . . , K ) is a subscript for match-intervals and Ik(t) are time-varying
dummy variables for subsequent match-intervals. The match is divided into two halves.
We estimate a constant and normalize λ0,r = 0. Extra time matches include one
additional interval. The conditional density function for the completed durations until
a red card was issued can be written as:
f (t | x, υ) = θr (t | x, υ) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
θr (t | x, υ) ds
)
(4)
Several unobserved factors such as coach tactics, weather or match attendance might
affect the goal-scoring rate. We assume that these unobservablesυ come from a discrete
distribution G with two points of support (υ1, υ2), representing two types of teams,
one with a low red card rate and another with high red card rate. The associated
probabilities are denoted as follows: Pr(υ = υ1) = p1, Pr(υ = υ2 −υ1) = p2, where
p j ( j = 1, 2) is assumed to have a logistic distribution. We remove the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution through integration:
f (t | x) =
∫
υ
f (t | x, υ) dG(υ) (5)
In the analysis for matches without a red card, the duration of the red card is assumed
to be censored at the end of the match. The likelihood function is optimized using the
method of maximum likelihood.
3.2 The effects of a red card
Figure 3 plots the goal-scoring rate before and after a first red card was issued, focusing
on the first goal scored before the red card (this includes also matches with no red
cards given) and the first goal scored after a red card sanction. The goal-scoring rate
is higher after a red card has been issued. The goal-scoring rate after a team receives a
red card appears to be lower compared to a situation when the opponent receives a red
card. There seems to be an increase in the goal-scoring rate toward the end of a match,
a well-known fact found also in previous studies (Van Ours and van Tuijl 2011).
The focus of our analysis is on the effect of a first red card on the goal-scoring
rate of both the sanctioned and the non-sanctioned team. Each match is divided into
several periods by the goals scored and the red cards given, with episodes from a goal
to a red card or to the end of a match being right-censored.3 The effect of the red card
is modeled as a shift in the goal-scoring (hazard) rate. To estimate the effect, we use
3 Only one red card in the dataset resulted in a penalty kick. Excluding this observation has no effects on
the results.
123
J. ˇCervený et al.
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
.
08
G
oa
l s
co
rin
g 
ra
te
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Minutes
No Red Card Opponent Red Card Red Card
Fig. 3 Goal-scoring rate before and after red card
a mixed proportional hazard framework which allows the rate of transition from one
state to the other to be affected by individual observed and unobserved characteristics
as well as the duration of the stay in a state (Heckman and Singer 1984). In our case,
the state is defined by the current number of goals scored by the team, considering also
whether or not a red card was given. The transition rate is equivalent to the goal-scoring
rate. As additional observed characteristics, we use the pre-tournament FIFA ranking
of both teams and the current stage of the tournament. We also take a possible referee
bias into account. Thus, the goal-scoring rate at the time of a match ti conditional on
the observed characteristics x , the time of the opponent’s the red card sanction trc,
time of the own red card sanction torc and the unobserved characteristics ν, the model
is specified as follows:
θ
(
ti | x, trc, torc, ν
) = λ(ti ) exp
(
x ′β + δ1 I (ti > trc) + δ2 I
(
ti > t
o
rc
) + ν) (6)
where β is a vector of parameters. The parameter δ1 describes how the hazard rate
shifts at the moment a red card was issued and thus measures the effect of an opponent’s
red card on the goal-scoring rate. Similarly, the parameter δ2 measures the shift of the
goal-scoring rate after a team receives a red card.4 The subscript i denotes the period
from a goal scored or a red card awarded. The first period from the beginning of the
match up until the first event (a goal scored or a red card issued) is denoted as i = 1.
The duration dependence is flexibly modeled using step function:
λ(ti ) = exp
(
∑
k
λk Ik(ti )
)
(7)
4 Note that we model only one of these events. If a second red card is imposed, match time stops at which
point the goal-scoring rate is assumed to be right-censored.
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where k(=1, . . . , K ) is a subscript for match-intervals and Ik(t) are time-varying
dummy variables for subsequent match-intervals. The match is divided into two halves,
assuming an injury time of 5 min. Extra time matches include one additional interval,
allowing for a third injury time of 2 min.5 We estimate a constant and normalize λ0 = 0.
The conditional density function for the completed durations until goal scored can be
written as:
f (ti | x, trc, torc, ν
) = θ (ti | x, trc, torc, ν
)
exp
(
−
∫ ti
ti−1
θ
(
ti | x, trc, torc, ν
)
ds
)
(8)
Note that ti−1 denotes the time of a previous event in the match, either a goal scored
or a red card issued. Several unobserved factors such as coach tactics, the weather
or match attendance might affect the goal-scoring rate. We assume that the random
effects ν come from a discrete distribution G with two points of support (ν1, ν2),
representing two types of teams, one with a low goal-scoring rate and another with
a high goal-scoring rate. The associated probabilities are denoted as follows: Pr(ν =
ν1) = p1, Pr(ν = ν2 − ν1) = p2, where pn (n = 1, 2) is assumed to have a logistic
distribution. We remove the unobserved heterogeneity distribution through integration:
f (ti | x, trc, torc
) =
∫
ν
f (ti | x, trc, torc, ν
)
dG(ν) (9)
The resulting log-likelihood function equals:
L =
N∑
j=1
log
{ I∏
i=1
θ
(
ti | x, trc, torc
)di exp
(
−
∫ ti
ti−1
θ
(
ti | x, trc, torc
))
}
(10)
considering a dataset consisting of j = 1, . . . , N matches, i = 1, . . . , I denotes the
period in a match from the first goal scored or red card issued, with I being the last
part from a goal scored or a red card awarded until the end of match, while di denotes
the indicator of whether a goal was scored. The parameters of the likelihood function
are estimated using the method of maximum likelihood.
4 Parameter estimates
4.1 Red card sanction rate
Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of the red card sanction rate. The FIFA
ranking of teams does not seem to have an effect on the rate at which red cards are
issued during a match. Compared to the group stage, later stages of a tournament also
do not have an effect. As expected, the more goals ahead, the lower the probability
of conducting a red card foul. With each goal ahead, the probability decreases by
5 We also test for an alternative specification of 15-min intervals finding that our main parameter estimates
are not affected by this.
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(exp(−1.42) − 1) × 100 ≈ 75%. Column (2) presents estimates excluding extra time
matches.
From the first two columns, it is a clear that the imposition of a red card is not
related to the rank of a team or its opponent. The stage of tournament is not important
either. The only determinant of the red card sanction rate is the goal difference. If a
team has conceded more goals than it scored, it is more likely to receive a red card.
Furthermore, a red card is more likely to be issued in the second half of a match and
in particular in extra time. In column (3), we add the rank of the referee as an additional
explanatory variable. The number of observations drops substantially since there were
many referees for whom no ranking is available. The ranking of the referee has no
effect on the red card sanction rate. In column (4), we introduce a dummy variable for
matches in which no referee ranking is available. This dummy variable has a positive
effect suggesting that less skillful referees are more likely to issue a red card.
Nevertheless, the dummy variable is not different from zero at conventional levels of
significance. Finally, as an alternative to the FIFA ranking, we use bookmaker data as
an indication of the difference in strength between two teams in a match. We translate
pre-match betting odds into an expected number of points.6 The relevant parameter
estimates are presented in column (5). There is no significant effect of the expected
number of points on the red card sanction rate. In an additional sensitivity analysis,
we investigated whether unobserved heterogeneity is important, but we did not find
evidence of this.
4.2 The effects of a red card on the goal-scoring rate
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates of the goal-scoring rate. Initially, we ignore
potential unobserved heterogeneity in the goal-scoring rate. The first two columns
of the table present the effects making a distinction between the own team’s and
the opponent’s red card. Columns (3) and (4) extend the analysis by introducing
heterogeneity in the red card effect according to the time the card was issued. Clearly,
there is a highly significant positive effect on the goal-scoring rate after a red card is
imposed to the opposing team. The probability of scoring a goal increases by almost
(exp(0.81) − 1) × 100 ≈ 124%. In line with this, receiving a red card sanction has
significantly negative effects on the goal-scoring rate, lowering the rate by 47%. The
estimated coefficients of the FIFA ranking variables suggest that a lower ranking of a
team translates to a lower goal-scoring rate.
The higher the rank of a team, the lower the goal-scoring rate; the lower the ranking
of the opponent, the higher the goal-scoring rate. The stage of a tournament does not
seem to have much of an effect. The only difference being the quarterfinal stage where
the goal-scoring rate is to be lower as compared to the group stage. Whether or not
a referee was from the same continent does not influence the goal-scoring rate. The
6 See Van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) and the appendix for details. The number of observations decreases
slightly since pre-match betting odds are not available for all matches. Because we were unable to find
odds from a single source we use tournament-specific dummies to control for possible differences in the
structure of betting odds between tournaments.
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Table 6 Parameter estimates goal-scoring rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Match characteristics
Rank opponent 0.10*** (5.0) 0.10*** (5.1) 0.10*** (4.8) 0.10*** (4.9)
Rank own −0.16*** (5.6) −0.16*** (5.8) −0.16*** (5.7) −0.16*** (5.8)
16 finals −0.14 (1.3) −0.19 (1.5) −0.15 (1.4) −0.21* (1.6)
Quarterfinals −0.38* (1.8) −0.28 (1.4) −0.38* (1.8) −0.28 (1.4)
Semifinals −0.31 (1.0) −0.31 (0.9) −0.31 (1.0) −0.31 (0.9)
Final/3rd place m. 0.08 (0.4) 0.12 (0.6) 0.05 (0.2) 0.12 (0.6)
Same continent ref. 0.06 (0.4) 0.07 (0.5) 0.05 (0.3) 0.06 (0.4)
Constant −4.36*** (47.4) −4.36*** (47.1) −4.34*** (46.5) −4.34*** (46.2)
Panel B: Duration dependence
Second half 0.16** (2.3) 0.17** (2.4) 0.16** (2.3) 0.16** (2.3)
Extra time 0.12 (0.4) 0.11 (0.4)
Panel C: Red card effects
Effect RC 0.81*** (6.7) 0.80*** (6.5)
Effect own RC −0.63** (2.2) −0.66** (2.3)
Effect RC 0–45 0.80*** (4.8) 0.80*** (4.9)
Effect RC 45–75 0.53** (2.6) 0.56** (2.7)
Effect RC 75–120 1.41*** (6.6) 1.35*** (5.8)
Effect own RC 0–45 −1.19** (3.0) −1.19** (3.0)
Effect own RC 45–75 −0.30 (0.7) −0.40 (0.9)
Effect own RC 75–120 0.51 (0.7) 0.52 (0.7)
Log likelihood 4299.8 4192.1 4293.6 4187.2
Wald test χ2 49.3*** 40.3***
Wald test DF 4 4
Rank divided by 10. Tournament year dummies for column (5) not reported
RC red card
640 observations; absolute t statistics in parentheses; Standard errors clustered at the match level
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
goal-scoring rate is higher in the second half of a match than in the first half. In extra
time, the goal-scoring rate is highest.
From columns (3) and (4), it appears that the effect of a red card given between
the 45th and 75th minute of a match lowers the goal-scoring rate when compared to
red cards given either earlier or later in a match. The parameter estimate of a red card
received between the 75th and the 120th minute shows some evidence of the “ten do it
better” myth. However the parameter estimate is statistically not significantly different
from zero. The result of the Wald test confirms that the additional time-specific red
card effects significantly improve the model fit. Apparently, the timing of the red card
is important. Columns (2) and (4) present estimates excluding extra time matches. The
effect on the magnitude of the parameter estimates is negligible. It was not possible
to identify unobserved heterogeneity in the goal-scoring rates.
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis
To explore the robustness of our findings, we present a wide range of sensitivity anal-
ysis of which the main results are summarized in Table 7. To investigate possible
heterogeneity in the effects of a red card on the goal-scoring rate, we introduce inter-
action effects between a red card and the experience or the age of a player sent off.
Such an interaction is also investigated with the line in which the player was deployed
(attack, midfield or defense). Interaction effects of both an own and an opponent’s red
card with the age and experience shown in column (1) suggest that the loss of an older
or experienced player does not present a significant advantage.7 Column (2) introduces
an interaction with the line of play of the player sent off finding no significant effects.
Column (3) investigates whether there is a difference in the shift of the goal-scoring
rate resulting from a second yellow red card or straight red card. A foul or misconduct
resulting in a straight red card does not have a significantly different impact on the
goal-scoring rate either.
We also analyze whether there is a difference in the effect of receiving a red card on
the goal-scoring rate of an experienced team. A national team is defined as experienced
if a country participated in every World Cup since 1982. Six countries fulfill this
criterion—Argentina, Brazil, England, Italy, Germany and Spain—accounting for 12
red cards in the analysis.
The results shown in column (4) indicate that these teams have higher goal-scoring
rate after the sending-off of an own player compared to the others. However, the esti-
mated parameter narrowly misses the 10% significance level. Finally, we investigate
whether a different measure of team strength has any effects on the results, as FIFA
ranking has been criticized as unreliable. Instead, as before we employ betting odds
translated into the expected number of points from a match. As shown in column
(5), including the expected number of points as a measure of team strength results
in a negligible change in magnitude of the estimates compared to the baseline. The
main conclusion holds, as teams with higher expected number of points have higher
goal-scoring rate.
5 Conclusions
We analyze 320 World Cup matches to investigate both the determinants of the issuing
of a red card and the effects of a red card on goal-scoring. We find the rate at which a
red card is issued to depend on the goal difference that evolves during a match. Teams
who are behind in terms of goals scored are more likely to be confronted with a red
card. We also find that the sending-off of a player presents a significant disadvantage
for the team that is confronted with a red card. The size of this effect depends on the
time the red card was issued.
Our results suggest that the sending-off of a player does not translate into a better
performance of the sanctioned team. Hence, our findings are at odds with the “ten do
it better” myth. It may be that the loss of a player results in increased motivation of the
7 Introducing age-squared does not improve the estimation results.
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remaining players on the pitch. However, on balance smaller teams do worse. Appar-
ently, the loss of a player in a sports competition presents a significant disadvantage
which is be difficult to overcome through increased effort.
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Appendix: Definition of variables
Rank own FIFA ranking of the team of which the goal-scoring rate and the red card
sanction rate is estimated. The ranking is established before the start of each tourna-
ment.
Rank opponent FIFA ranking of the opposing team.
Expected number of points Calculated using pre-match betting odds. These odds are
from various Web sites including sports.williamhill.com and www.betexplorer.com.
Stage of a tournament Reference category: group stage.
Goal difference before red card Number of goals scored minus the number of goals
conceded at the time the first red card was issued.
Goals scored Number of goals scored.
Same continent referee Dummy variable; takes value of one if the team is from the
same continent as the referee. If both teams are from the same continent as the referee,
the variable takes value of zero.
Referee rank Based on International Federation of Football History and Statistics
annual ranking. We use the ranking of a referee 1 year prior to the tournament (if
available).
Age Age of a player at the start of a tournament.
Caps Number of caps of a player at the start of a tournament.
Position of a player Line of a play on the pitch—midfield, attack. Reference category:
defense, including goalkeeper.
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